Mercer Law Review
Volume 50
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 15

12-1998

Wills, Trusts, and Administration of Estates
James C. Rehberg

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation
Rehberg, James C. (1998) "Wills, Trusts, and Administration of Estates," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 50 : No.
1 , Article 15.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol50/iss1/15

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Wills, Trusts, and Administration
of Estates
by James C. Rehberg*
The aim of this Article is to summarize judicial and legislative
developments in fiduciary law within the past year. Its organization
reflects an intention to discuss the particular issues somewhat in the
chronological sequence in which they are likely to appear.
I.
A.

RECENT DECISIONS-WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION

PreliminaryIssues

Sharp v.
1. Inheritance by a Child Born Out of Wedlock.
Varner1 is the sequel to Varner v. Sharp,2 in which a daughter born out
of wedlock claimed to be the sole heir of her intestate father. The claim
was opposed by the intestate's brother, who also claimed to be sole heir.3
The court of appeals ruled in the latter case that the daughter had
offered clear and convincing evidence that she was the intestate's
daughter, but that she had not offered similar evidence that he intended
for her to inherit his estate to the exclusion of the intestate's brother.4
On remand, the probate court heard testimony which it found sufficient
to show both that the daughter was her father's natural child and that
he intended for her to take his estate as sole heir.5 The brother
* Professor Emeritus, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Mercer
University (A.B., 1940; J.D., 1948); Duke University (L.L.M., 1952). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
1. 226 Ga. App. 570, 486 S.E.2d 701 (1997).
2. 219 Ga. App. 125, 464 S.E.2d 388 (1995).
3. Id. at 125, 464 S.E.2d at 388.
4. Id. at 127, 464 S.E.2d at 389.
5. 226 Ga. App. at 571, 486 S.E.2d at 702. See also O.C.G.A. § 53-4-4(c)(1)(E) (1995)
which required both types of clear and convincing evidence. It is worthy of note at this
point that this code section has since been substantially rewritten in the Revised Probate
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appealed, claiming evidence that the father loved both his brother and
his daughter and that he wanted to benefit both of them could not be
clear and convincing because it supported two different conclusions-either that she alone inherit the estate, or that she be provided
for by the one joint account with her name on it.6
The court of appeals affirmed, stating that the clear and convincing
evidence test does not eliminate all but one possible conclusion.7
Instead, it sets an intermediate standard of proof, one greater than the
preponderance of evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Further explanation by the court of the results of this case indicates
that a person may die intestate and still do some valid "estate planning,"
however ill-advised. The court stated that this decedent was favorably
disposed to both the child born out of wedlock and the brother, wanting
to bestow his bounty upon both, and that he appeared to have accomplished both objectives. 9 The evidence showed that the brother's name
appeared on several of the decendant's bank accounts, including at least
one joint account which the brother took as survivor, and that the
brother was also the beneficiary of the decedent's three life insurance
policies. This combination of will substitutes and the rules of intestacy
carried out the decedent's intention to provide for both his brother and
his daughter. The daughter got the intestate assets and the brother got
the benefit of the will substitutes.' °
2. Inheritance by Virtual Adoption. When the decedent in
Franklin v. Gilchrist" married in 1961, his wife brought into the
marriage two minor children by a previous marriage, which had ended
in divorce, and in which she was awarded custody of the children. The
decedent and his wife had no children of their own, and while there was
undisputed evidence that he had been a good stepfather, he never
formally adopted the children. The children kept their natural father's
surname, but they seldom saw him before his death. Their mother
predeceased the decedent, and when he died he left no will.' 2

Code 1996 Supp. See O.C.G.A. § 53-2-3(2)(A)(v) (1997), which requires for such a child to
inherit, only that there be clear and convincing evidence "that the child is the child of the
father."
6. 226 Ga. App. at 571, 486 S.E.2d at 702.
7. Id. at 572, 486 S.E.2d at 703.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 268 Ga. 497, 491 S.E.2d 361 (1997).
12. Id. at 498, 491 S.E.2d at 362.

1998]

WILLS AND TRUSTS

383

When the decedent's sister applied for appointment as administratrix
of the estate, the two children filed a caveat, claiming that they were the
virtually adopted children of the decedent, that they were, therefore, the
sole heirs, and that one of them should be appointed to administer the
estate.1 3 The probate court denied the caveat and issued letters to the
sister of the decedent appointing her as administratrix.14 The superior
court, after a jury trial, directed a verdict for the decedent's sister on the
ground that virtual adoption is a matter of contract, and that there was
insufficient evidence of an agreement to adopt the children.15
The supreme court affirmed, emphasizing that an essential element of
a virtual adoption claim is the existence of an adoption agreement
entered into by parties competent to contract for the disposition of the
child.16 Here the children presented no evidence that the natural
father ever agreed to an adoption by the decedent, no evidence as to why
such agreement was not obtained prior to the natural father's death, and
no evidence of any agreement between the mother and the decedent for
their adoption. At most the evidence showed that these children came
to live with the decedent because they were his wife's children and she
was their custodial parent."
3. Year's Support. The precise place of year's support in Georgia's
laws of succession to property was clarified considerably in this survey
period by three opinions of the court of appeals.
a. Effect of Failure to Notify an Interested Party. In Scott v.
8
Grant,"
a widow filed an application for twelve months support naming
only two persons as interested parties, and after no objections were filed,
the probate court granted the application. 9 Later, one of the named
interested parties moved for a new trial on the ground that there were
other interested parties, specifically a bank, a church, and a granddaughter.2" The probate court granted the new trial on the ground that
the failure to name these other interested parties rendered the grant of
the application void ab initio.2" A grandson, to whom the widow had
conveyed a tract of land, objected on the ground that the granting of the

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
227 Ga. App. 1, 487 S.E.2d 627 (1997).
Id. at 1, 487 S.E.2d at 627.
Id.
Id.
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motion for new trial placed a cloud on the title to that tract. The
grandson appealed from the probate court's denial of his motion to
vacate that order.22
The court of appeals reversed, holding that even if there were
interested parties who were not listed on the application, this would not
automatically render the grant of the application a nullity.2 3 The
statute 24 requires only that the affidavit of the applicant list all
interested parties known to the applicant and that he or she make
reasonable inquiry as to the names and addresses of all interested
parties. There is no authority declaring such an application void simply
because there may be interested parties who are not listed. The court
noted that in this case none of the complaining persons claimed not to
have received notice.25
b. Effect of Other Resources of the Applicant. In Richards v.
Wadsworth,26 the husband filed for a year's support out of the estate of
his deceased wife. A jury awarded him $40,000, but the probate court
entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reducing the award to
the statutory minimum of $1,600.27 The court of appeals affirmed and
explained the effect of the existence of other resources available for the
support of an applicant.2 ' The applicable statute spelling out how the
amount of the award was to be ascertained, directed that consideration
be given to the support available to the applicant from sources other
than "year's support."29 The specificity of the facts made this a good
case for the court to use in the interpretation of the present statute. For
example, the husband's waiting for over one year after the wife's death
to file his application allowed the use of precise figures to show both his
support needs for the year and the exact amount, independent of his
resources, available to him during that year. This undisputed evidence
showed the amount needed to maintain his standard of living during the
year after her death was approximately $140,000. His independent
resources during that year amounted to $334,000, not including the right
given him in the will to live in their home the rest of his life free of any

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 2, 487 S.E.2d at 627.
Id., 487 S.E.2d at 628.
O.C.G.A. § 53-5-8 (1997).
227 Ga. App. at 3, 487 S.E.2d at 628.
230 Ga. App. 421, 496 S.E.2d 535 (1998).

27. Id. at 421-22, 496 S.E.2d at 536.
28. Id. at 423, 496 S.E.2d at 537.
29. At the death of the applicant's wife in 1995, the controlling statute was O.C.G.A.
§ 53-5-2(c). That section, now in the Revised Probate Code, is O.C.G.A. § 53-3-7(c) (Supp.
1996). It no longer provides for a minimum award. Id.
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expenses of maintenance, insurance, and repairs.3 0 These facts led the
court to the inescapable conclusion that the most the husband was
entitled to was the $1,600 minimum based on status alone."' No
support needs were shown.

c.

Year's Support and Bankruptcy. In McClure v. Mason,3' a

husband died while his Chapter 11 bankruptcy action was pending. His
wife applied for a year's support and was duly awarded some cash,
personal property, and realty. A bankruptcy creditor of the deceased
husband appealed, claiming that the award was an unlawful award of
property vested in the bankruptcy estate, and consequently, the awarded
assets did not belong to the decedent's estate and could not be awarded
as year's support.3 3
The court of appeals affirmed the award but admitted that the probate
court could only award the wife property belonging to the husband's
estate, and that it had no jurisdiction to decide whether the property
was vested in the wife, her husband's estate, or the bankruptcy
estate.34 However, these limitations did not prevent the probate court
from including the property in the year's support award. If any property
awarded did not in fact constitute a part of the husband's estate, then
the probate court's judgment simply would not attach to such property
and would be void as applied to it. Even if no legal title to any property
remained in the decedent's estate at his death, any equitable estate
owned by him may be included in a year's support award. Any
enforcement of that award (a point not yet reached) would require a
determination of the nature and existence of that title or interest by a
court with jurisdiction of that issue.35 The court interpreted the award
as that of whatever interest in the listed assets the husband had at
death.36
4. Will Substitutes. A valid will substitute, by definition, removes
the subject property from the decedent's probate estate. Whether it is
a valid substitute, however, is often a vigorously disputed issue. Two
cases in this survey period illustrate how will substitutes work and what
pitfalls are often encountered if they are used in estate planning.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

230 Ga. App. at 423, 496 S.E.2d at 537.
Id. at 424, 496 S.E.2d at 537.
228 Ga. App. 797, 493 S.E.2d 16 (1997).
Id. at 798, 493 S.E.2d at 16.
Id., 493 S.E.2d at 17.
Id.
Id.
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Caldwell v. Walraven 37 concerned the estates of a husband and wife
who married in 1936 and lived together until his death in 1985. They
never had children. The husband's will left his entire estate to the wife
for life, giving her the power to dispose of any or all of it as she deemed
necessary. His will also provided that any of his property remaining in
her estate at her death was to be divided equally among two of his and
three of her nieces and nephews. 8
Nine months before her death, in partial exercise of her power, she
sold the family home for $180,000. With the proceeds she purchased a
condominium for $72,000 (taking title in her own name) and a certificate
of deposit for $108,000 (taking title to it in the names of herself and a
niece, whom she named as executrix of her estate). Shortly after the
wife's death in 1996, two of the nephews, who were remaindermen under
the husband's will, filed for an accounting and for final settlement of his
estate, contending that they were entitled under his will to a pro rata
share of the proceeds that resulted from the sale of the home. The niece,
as representative of the wife's estate, filed for an accounting as to the
husband's estate. She claimed that there were no assets left in his
estate because the condominium passed under the wife's will and the
funds in the certificate of deposit already belonged to the neice, either
because the wife had made an inter vivos gift of the funds to her or
because she was the surviving party to the joint account set up by the
wife after the sale of the home.3 9 The trial court agreed that the
condominium was an asset of the wife's estate that would pass under her
will, and that the funds in the certificate of deposit should pass to the
niece as surviving party to the joint account.4 ° The two nephews
appealed.41
In reversing and remanding the case, the supreme court said that the
controlling issues were, first, the extent of the power held by the wife,
and second, whether the wife made a valid inter vivos gift of the
proceeds of the sale of the condominium when she invested it in the
certificate.42 The wife clearly could dispose of the proceeds of the sale
under the terms of the power given her, but she did not do so.4 As to
her property interest, Georgia law provides that, absent a provision in
the will to the contrary, the proceeds of an authorized sale by a life
tenant stand in the place of the property sold, and are therefore subject
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

268 Ga. 444, 490 S.E.2d 384 (1997).
Id. at 444-45, 490 S.E.2d at 385.
Id.
Id. at 445, 490 S.E.2d at 385-86.
Id., 490 S.E.2d at 386.
Id. at 449, 490 S.E.2d at 387.
Id. at 448, 490 S.E.2d at 387.
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to the same life estate, including the power of disposition, and to the
same remainders."
The life tenant had an extremely broad and
but
it
was
exercisable only during her life, not by her
general
power,
45
will.
Prior to 1976, when Georgia adopted the Uniform Probate Code
provisions on multiple-party accounts,4 6 Georgia cases rigidly applied
the law of inter vivos gifts to the creation of joint accounts, including the
intention to give and the requirement of delivery.47 The same result is
reached under the present statute,4 8 which provides that a joint account
is presumed to belong, during the lives of the parties, to the parties in
proportion to the net contributions of each. Here the wife furnished the
entire cost of the account, and there was no evidence that she made a
gift of the proceeds when she purchased the certificate.49
Despite the value of their flexibility in estate planning, the use of will
substitutes carries an even greater risk when they are used shortly
before death. In Bradshaw v. McNeill,5 ° that risk was heightened by
the decedent giving the joint tenant a broad power of attorney over the
affairs of the decedent, who created the joint account. After the
decedent's death in 1984, the surviving wife converted several accounts
and certificates of deposit which she had held in joint tenancy with him
into joint accounts in her name and in that of a niece, who resided in
Florida. Years later, when her health began to fail, another niece who
lived nearby began helping her. She then executed a will in which she
left her estate in equal shares to these two nieces. 5'
A month before her death, she and the niece caring for her went to her
attorney, and she executed a power of attorney in favor of this niece. A
week later, again accompanied by this niece, she conveyed her home to
the neice, reserving to herself a life estate.5 2
Two days before the decedent's death, this niece admitted her to a
convalescent home. The next day, after examining the will and learning
that she and the niece in Florida were to share equally in the estate,
this niece used her power of attorney to liquidate most of the joint
accounts, which totaled over $70,000. With this money she opened new

44. See Shields v. Shields, 264 Ga. 559, 448 S.E.2d 436 (1994).
45. 268 Ga. at 447, 490 S.E.2d at 387.
46. 1976 Ga. Laws 1388, § 8 (approving Ga. S. Bill 492).
47. See Stewart v. Stewart, 228 Ga. 517, 186 S.E.2d 746 (1972).
48. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-813(a) (1997).
49. 268 Ga. at 449, 490 S.E.2d at 388.
50. 228 Ga. App. 653, 492 S.E.2d 568 (1997).
51. Id. at 653, 492 S.E.2d at 569.
52. Id.
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accounts in the names of the decedent and herself. Withdrawal
penalties cost several hundred dollars.5"
When the Florida niece learned of these transactions, she sued the
Georgia niece, alleging fraud and undue influence (1) in the liquidation
of the accounts which had been in the names of the decedent and
plaintiff and (2) in the use of funds to open accounts in the names of the
decedent and defendant. The Florida niece also alleged fraud in the
execution of the deed conveying the decedent's house to defendant.
Appeal was taken by defendant based on the trial court's actions on
various motions for summary judgment, some of which were granted and
some denied.54
The court of appeals held that the trial court correctly denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the joint account issue.55
The court stated that the power of attorney, pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 7-1-812(a), permitted defendant to close out any checking or
savings accounts and to open new ones. Because the niece in Florida did
not contribute to those accounts, either the decedent or defendant (acting
under the power of attorney) had authorization to close these accounts
at any time prior to the decedent's death.55 However, the specific terms
of the power of attorney complicated this issue. The power specified that
any action taken be on behalf of the principal (the decedent). Thus
factual questions remained on whether defendant, as donee of the power,
acted in self-interest or acted on behalf of the decedent on the latter's
actual intent regarding
ownership of the joint accounts and of the
57
certificates of deposit.
Both the transfer of the house to defendant and the creation of the
power of attorney in her happened within the last month of decedent's
life. The confidential relationship between the donor and donee of the
power of attorney thus created a presumption of undue influence. This
fact, coupled with an affidavit in the record stating that the decedent
was not herself during the last six months of her life, precluded
summary judgment.5 8

53. Id. at 653-54, 492 S.E.2d at 569.
54. Id. at 654, 492 S.E.2d at 570.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 7-1-812(a) (1997), specifying ownership rights during the
lifetime of all of the parties).
57. Id. at 654-55, 492 S.E.2d at 570.
58. Id. at 655, 492 S.E.2d at 571.
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Problems Encountered DuringAdministration

1. Jurisdiction of Superior Court During Administration. In
Dismer v. Luke, 9 the probate court, after a caveat had been filed and
dismissed, admitted the will to probate. It then assessed attorney fees
and costs against the caveatrix and her attorney for filing a meritless
and frivolous caveat. ° The caveatrix and her attorney appealed to the
superior court, arguing that the statute on frivolous actions and
appeals6 ' contemplated a final judgment and that, in this case, the
administration of the estate was ongoing at the time the caveat was
filed. The appellants also argued that whether sanctions should be
awarded is a jury question. They appealed from an adverse judgment
in the superior court on that issue.62
The court of appeals set aside the superior court's award, ruling that
the award of sanctions was part of the final judgment in which the will
was admitted to probate and testamentary letters issued. 3 These and
other issues were resolved by that judgment, regardless of whether the
administration of the estate remained open. The superior court erred in
holding that whether sanctions should be assessed was an issue for the
jury." That, the court of appeals said, directly contradicted the clear
language
of the statute. 5 This error demanded a remand of the
66
case.

2. Partition of Estate Realty During Administration. In Clay
v. Clay,67 a mother's will left a piece of realty (the sole asset) to two
sons, whom she named as coexecutors. During probate proceedings one
son petitioned for statutory partition of the realty.68 The partitioners
duly filed their return, dividing the property into two parcels deemed of
equal value. The other son objected, claiming the first son had no

59. 228 Ga. App. 638, 492 S.E.2d 562 (1997).
60. Id. at 638, 492 S.E.2d at 563.
61. O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
62. 228 Ga. App. at 638, 492 S.E.2d at 563.
63. Id. at 639, 492 S.E.2d at 563.
64. Id. at 640, 492 S.E.2d at 564.
65. Id. at 639-40, 492 S.E.2d at 564.
66. Id.
67. 268 Ga. 40, 485 S.E.2d 205 (1997).
68. See O.C.G.A. § 44-6-160 (1991), which is premised on the parties' being common
"owners" of the land. It would seem that if anyone "owned" the land before admission of
the will to probate, it was the two sole heirs. The court did not trace the precise devolution
of title.
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standing to bring the partition action because he was not the "owner,"
the entire estate was still in probate, and it still owed debts.69 The
supreme court affirmed the partition."v Under the applicable statute,
one of two executors can validly give assent to a devise unless another
is in possession (which was not the case here).7 '
That there were estate debts did not preclude the bringing of the
partition action and the assenting to the devise.
Even if there were
still unpaid estate creditors, they could follow the estate assets (the
land) into the hands of a distributee.7v
3. Removal of Executor. Georgia's removal statute 74 gives the
probate court broad powers to remove an executor upon a showing of
waste or mismanagement, or upon a showing that he is unfit for the
position. The will in Nesmith v. Piercev5 named plaintiff and the
testatrix' eighty-nine-year-old mother as coexecutors. Plaintiff, an
experienced real estate attorney, offered to sell the estate realty himself
without charging a commission. Plaintiff produced two appraisals, one
for $130,000 and one for $145,500. Defendant, the coexecutor, refused
to agree, insisting that plaintiff list the realty at $170,000. Plaintiff
testified that he showed the property to eighteen prospects and received
two offers, one for $126,850 and the other for $155,000. He stated his
fear that a counter-offer would cause withdrawal of the higher offer. He
also stated that there were other problems; namely, that defendant
wanted to distribute the estate immediately even though she had little
understanding of tax problems, wanted to keep the estate invested in
low-yielding accounts, and wanted to leave estate jewelry in a safe in her
apartment rather than in a safety deposit box. Defendant executor did
not testify; her only evidence was the testimony of a niece and a
granddaughter that she was alert and capable of handling money.7 "
The court of appeals affirmed the probate court's order removing the
elderly executor.7 7 The evidence showed she did not fully understand
the duties and responsibilities of an executor and may have already
acted in a manner detrimental to the estate. 7v The court of appeals

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

268 Ga. at 41, 485 S.E.2d at 206.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 53-2-110 (1995).
See Lewis v. Patterson, 191 Ga. 348, 12 S.E.2d 593 (1940).
See Morrison v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 150 Ga. 54, 102 S.E. 354 (1920).
O.C.G.A. § 53-7-148 (1997).
226 Ga. App. 851, 487 S.E.2d 687 (1997).
Id. at 851-52, 487 S.E.2d at 688.
Id. at 852, 487 S.E.2d at 688.
Id.
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concluded that the probate court acted within its discretion in removing
this executor.v9
There was one other issue. Defendant complained of the probate
court's award to plaintiff of extra compensation for extraordinary
services in the attempted sale of the property despite plaintiff's original
offer to handle the sale without a commission. The facts showed that
defendant's actions made plaintiff's additional services necessary.
Plaintiff could have employed an agent to sell the property, as provided
by statute, ° and had he done so, that agent would have been entitled
to a commission. 8 '
4. Successor Executor. The will in Robbins v. Vanbrackle2
named the testatrix' mother as executor and then provided that "in the
event my mother should predecease me" the testatrix' daughter should
serve. When the testatrix died, her mother was alive but was incompetent." The trial court construed the will as not naming a successor
executor and thus appointed as administrator with the will annexed a
person selected by the heirs.8 4
The supreme court affirmed, holding that the only contingency for the
appointment of the daughter was that the mother predecease the
testatrix."5 This contingency did not occur; hence the procedure under
O.C.G.A. section 53-6-29 was appropriately followed. Two dissenting
justices felt that the majority was being overly technical.8 6 They were
convinced that the testatrix' use of the word "predecease" was intended
to refer to any circumstance in which the primary nominee should be
unable to serve and that this intention should be carried out. 7
5. Guardianship and Suretyship. Osborne Bonding & Surety Co.
v. Glazes8 examined the effectiveness and enforceability of a guardian's
bond. A mother was appointed guardian of the property of her minor
son who had inherited money from his deceased father. Upon her
appointment, she entered into an agreement with defendant, a bonding
company, which issued bonds in the amount of $80,000 to secure her

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 53-6-149 (1997).
226 Ga. App. 852-53, 487 S.E.2d at 689.
267 Ga. 871, 485 S.E.2d 468 (1997).
Id. at 871, 485 S.E.2d at 468.
Id. See also O.C.G.A. § 53-6-29 (1995).

85. 267 Ga. at 871, 485 S.E.2d at 468.
86. Id. at 872-73, 485 S.E.2d at 469.
87. Id.
88. 230 Ga. App. 895, 497 S.E.2d 612 (1998).
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faithful performance as guardian. 9 After she failed to file courtordered annual returns for 1994 and 1995 and failed to appear at a
"show cause" hearing, the probate court revoked her guardianship and
appointed another guardian. 90 In May 1996 the mother filed for
bankruptcy. The new guardian then obtained a bankruptcy court order
lifting the automatic stay pursuant to the federal statute, 91 which
allowed the new guardian to proceed in probate court to determine
whether there had been such mismanagement as would render the
former guardian and her surety liable.92
Undisputed evidence showed that there had in fact been mismanagement, causing a loss of over $52,000 to the minor son's estate. The new
guardian asked the probate court to enter a judgment in that amount,
jointly and severally, against the mother and her surety on the
guardianship bond. The surety asked the court to release it from
liability for the mother's mismanagement prior to her discharge as
guardian.9 3 The probate court refused and, instead, held the mother
and her surety jointly and severally liable.94
The court of appeals affirmed, stating that the surety's argument was
without merit.95 The court recognized that the statute 98 provided
that, in a case of mismanagement, the court may discharge the surety
from liability for breaches prior to the guardian's removal. But the
statute also expressly stated that the probate judge's decision in the
matter is purely discretionary. 7 Also, even if such a discharge were
granted, it would only relieve the surety from liability for acts of
misconduct committed after the discharge. 9 Any other conclusion, the
court said, would be illogical in that it would defeat the very concept of
a surety-to afford protection during a suretyship.9 9 The court also
stated that there was no merit in the surety's argument that the
pending bankruptcy filing tied the hands of the probate court because
the new guardian had sought and obtained permission of the bankruptcy
court to proceed in the probate court."°

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 895, 497 S.E.2d at 612.
Id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
230 Ga. App. at 895, 497 S.E.2d at 612.
Id., 497 S.E.2d at 612-13.
Id., 497 S.E.2d at 613.
Id. at 896, 497 S.E.2d at 613.
O.C.G.A. § 29-2-52(b) (1997).
230 Ga. App. at 896, 497 S.E.2d at 613.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Probate of Wills

The will in Hickox v. Wilson" 1 appears to have been homemade and
home-executed. When the testatrix asked a friend to witness the signing
of the will, the friend told her that she believed that two witnesses and
a notary public were required. Arrangements were then made for
another witness and a notary to join them. According to an affidavit of
the friend, the testatrix again explained to them that they were to
witness her will. After the testatrix signed the will, the friend and
another witness signed, and it was then notarized by the notary. The
other witness testified that the testatrix signed in the presence of the
two witnesses and the notary. 102
The instrument itself consisted of three pages, all printed in the same
type and stapled together. Pages one and two contained all of the
dispositive provisions, and the third page was a self-proving affidavit,1 °3 as defined by statute.1 0 4 The two witnesses signed on page
two, and the notary signed on the line intended for the testatrix'
signature. The signature of the two witnesses also appeared on page
three, along with the notarization. The signature of the testatrix
appeared only above the word "Testator" on page three (the self-proving
affidavit).' °5
After the testatrix' death, her stepdaughter filed the three pages for
probate, and a caveat was filed by the testatrix' next of kin (some
nephews and nieces), which alleged that the document was not signed
by the testatrix and, therefore, was invalid. The issue was whether the
testatrix' signature on the self-proving affidavit satisfied the statutory
requirement that all wills shall be "signed by the person making the
will."0 6 After the probate court ordered the three pages admitted as
the will, an appeal to the superior court resulted in summary judgment
in favor of the caveators.' °7 Thus, the case was ripe for the supreme
court.
The supreme court reversed the superior court's decision and held that
it was merely an oversight that the signature of the testatrix appeared
on the wrong page.'0 8 The court stated that its ruling in Estate of

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

269 Ga. 180, 496 S.E.2d 711 (1998).
Id. at 180, 496 S.E.2d at 711-12.
Id., 496 S.E.2d at 712.
O.C.G.A. § 53-2-40.1 (1997).
269 Ga. at 180, 496 S.E.2d at 712.
O.C.G.A. § 53-2-40 (1997 & Supp. 1998).
269 Ga. at 180, 496 S.E.2d at 711.
Id. at 181, 496 S.E.2d at 712.
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Brannon"°9 applied to this case."' In Brannon it appeared that all
the pages were, in fact, pages of the will. The only issue was whether
the testator's signature had to appear on the same page as the signatures of the witnesses. There was no self-proving affidavit involved in
Brannon."' In fact, a reading of the self-proved will statute suggests
a will and a self-proving affidavit are two separate instruments, and
that the latter only attests that the former has previously been
executed.112
It appears to the writer that a more direct and convincing approach
to this case would have been to treat the issue solely as one of the
integration of the three pages into a single will. That approach would
have led to the result reached by the court and would have avoided any
implication that the self-proved will statute had any relevance in this
case.
D.

Will Construction-Ambiguities

Legare v. Legare. 3 offered a classic example of the effect of a
misnomer of a legatee in a valid will. The testatrix' will left the residue
of her estate to her nephew, John Houston Legare. It was discovered,
though, that she had no nephew by that name; instead, she had two
nephews, one named John Edward Legare and the other James Houston
Legare. In a declaratory judgment action brought to ascertain who was
the true legatee, a motion in limine was filed seeking to limit extrinsic
evidence to the circumstances that surrounded the ceremonial execution
of the will.1 14 The trial court granted this motion but certified the case
for immediate review. 5 The successor in interest of John Edward
Legare appealed, arguing that the court's evidentiary rule was too
restrictive.16
In reversing the case, the supreme court agreed that the ruling was
too restrictive and proceeded to identify the evidentiary rules applicable
in such cases." 7 Starting with the premise that the primary guide in
construing a will is the intention of the testator as gathered from its four
corners, the court noted that here one has to go outside those four
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264 Ga. 84, 441 S.E.2d 248 (1994).
269 Ga. at 181, 496 S.E.2d at 712.
264 Ga. at 84, 441 S.E.2d at 249.
O.C.G.A. § 53-2-40.1 (1997).
268 Ga. 474, 490 S.E.2d 369 (1997).
Id. at 475, 490 S.E.2d at 371.
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Id.
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corners in order to identify the correct legatee." 8 The only remaining
question was how far it should go. While the general rule is that parol
evidence is inadmissible to explain a will, there are two statutory
exceptions.' 19 The first of these exceptions allows parol evidence on
the circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of execution of
the will-for example, the recipients of the testator's bounty, their
relations with him, and his affection, or lack thereof, for them. 120 The
other exception allows the admission of parol evidence for the purpose
of explaining any latent or patent ambiguities in the will. 121 In Legare,
a latent ambiguity existed on which of the nephews was the intended
beneficiary. Each was specifically named, but when one goes outside the
will it is discovered that the testatrix did not name either of them
completely and accurately. Her actual intention, then, must be resolved
on the 2 2basis of parol evidence when the case goes back to the probate
1

court.

II.
A.

RECENT DECISIONS-TRUSTS

Integration of Lifetime and Testamentary Estate Plans

Otwell v. First National Bank of Gainesville'2' related to the interplay of a settlor's inter vivos trust and his will. In 1984 he set up the
inter vivos trust, naming the bank as trustee and providing for payment
of any part of the income to his son, with power in the trustee to
accumulate income and to encroach upon the principal for the son's
benefit. Any remaining principal at the son's death was to go to the
son's two children. In 1987 the settlor executed his will, in which he
directed that one-fourth of his estate be placed in a testamentary trust
for his son, with the remaining three-fourths to go outright to his three

daughters. 124
After the death of the father in 1988, the son and his two children (the
latter not mentioned in the will) filed a caveat to the will. This resulted
in a consent order being agreed upon by all parties, which modified the
will in very substantial ways. It modified the testamentary trust to
authorize the trustee bank (1) to expend testamentary trust income for
the (now incompetent) son's benefit when his income from other sources

118. Id.
119.

O.C.G.A. § 53-2-94 (1997).

120. See Olmstead v. Dunn, 72 Ga. 850 (1884).

121.

O.C.G.A. § 53-2-94 (1997).

122. 268 Ga. at 476, 490 S.E.2d at 372.
123. 268 Ga. 547, 491 S.E.2d 785 (1997).
124. Id. at 547-48, 491 S.E.2d at 787.
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proved inadequate, and also (2) to expend large amounts of such income
for the upkeep of the home and support of the son and his two children.
At the son's death, the home would go to his two children. The elaborate
consent order also provided that the testamentary trust principal should
remain constant unless and until the principal of the inter vivos trust
should be depleted. Lastly, the order provided that at the son's death
any remaining corpus of the testamentary trust should be divided
equally among the son's two children and his three sisters. 2 5
In the five years following the testator's death in 1988, the bank
expended $225,000 on renovation of the house, which had fallen into
disrepair. These expenditures were paid by the bank directly from the
portion of the testator's estate intended to fund the testamentary trust,
but the trust was not in fact established either at the testator's death (as
directed by the will) or during the five years immediately thereafter.
The bank stated in its petition that these expenditures paid from the
estate exceeded the income of the testamentary trust assets, based on
one-fourth of the estate's value, and thus had to be charged against
assets designated for the testamentary trust principal. In order to
rectify this depletion of testamentary trust principal, the bank sought
approval of a transfer from the principal of the inter vivos trust to the
principal of the testamentary trust. The son's two children opposed this
depletion of the principal of the inter vivos trust (of which they were
remainder beneficiaries).' 26
In 1993 the testamentary trust was finally funded, and in 1995 the
bank filed a declaratory judgment action. 2 ' The trial court granted
partial summary judgment in favor of the bank, authorizing the transfer
of these funds from the inter vivos trust to the testamentary trust to
cover the expenditures made from estate funds that were eventually to
be used to fund the testamentary trust. 128 The son's two children,
individually and as guardians of the son, appealed.' 29
By a four-to-three decision the supreme court affirmed.3 0 The court
noted that the trial court reserved ruling on whether the bank breached
any of its fiduciary duties; the only issue was the propriety of the
transfer of funds from the inter vivos trust to the testamentary trust to
cover those expenditures made from the estate funds that were
eventually to be used to fund the testamentary trust.'' The majority
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128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 548-49, 491 S.E.2d at 787.
Id. at 549, 491 S.E.2d at 787-88.
Id., 491 S.E.2d at 788.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 552, 491 S.E.2d at 790.
Id. at 549-50, 491 S.E.2d at 788.
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felt that the son's best interest was the dominant objective of both
trusts; by paying funds for a proper purpose from a secondary source,
the testamentary trust, and then reimbursing that source from the inter
vivos trust, the bank had not taken from the son's two children anything
to which they were otherwise entitled. 3 2 The majority felt that
ordering the bank to reimburse the testamentary trust out of its own
funds would result in an enormous windfall to the son's children, the
beneficiaries of the inter vivos trust. 133 The bank may not have
followed precisely the testator's direction, but the court found no hint of
abuse of discretion or bad faith."M
The dissenting justices stressed the fact that there were two separate
and independent trusts of which the bank was trustee, and that
ordinarily it is the duty of a trustee to keep trust assets of one trust
separate from those that it holds under other trusts. 135
B.

Removal of Trustees
In Moring v. Moring,3 6 the two trustees disagreed on the sale of a
building owned by the trust. On a petition by one trustee for permission
to sell, the other was personally served with notice but did not appear.
Before the sale, though, he objected and filed a notice for dismissal of the
petition. The order of sale did not address the effect of this attempt to
dismiss. There was on record, however, a 1994 probate court order
removing him as a trustee. On appeal, the objecting trustee challenged
the order of sale for the first time, alleging that the probate court lacked
jurisdiction to remove him as a trustee and that the 1994 record of a
probate
court order purporting to remove him as a trustee was void ab
13 7
initio.

The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case, but solely on the
ground of the trial court's failure to address the removed trustee's
attempt to dismiss the petition. 138 As for the more substantive issue
of jurisdiction of courts, the opinion pointed out that even though a
probate court has concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court to
appoint new trustees and to accept resignation of trustees, it has no
jurisdiction to remove a trustee.13 9 The principal code section on the

132. Id. at 550-51, 491 S.E.2d at 789.
133. Id. at 550, 491 S.E.2d at 789.
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Id. at 552, 491 S.E.2d at 790.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) Of TRUSTS § 179 cmt. a (1959)).
228 Ga. App. 662, 492 S.E.2d 558 (1997).
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Id. at 663, 492 S.E.2d at 559.
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subject of removal of trustees mentions only the superior court as having

such power.14 °
C.

Modification of TRusts

Georgia law has recognized the inherent power of a court of equity to
modify a trust,' but it was not until 1991 that the power appeared
in statutory form. 142 Under that statute, modification may be allowed,
but only if clear and convincing evidence establishes that, due to circumstances not known or anticipated by the settlor, compliance with the
1
terms of the instrument would impair the purposes of the trust. 4
Friedman v. Teplis'4 afforded the supreme court its first opportunity
to interpret the statute. The trial court made no specific finding on the
dominant trust objective, but did find that the intention of the settlors
(the two children of the insured) was for the trust to receive the proceeds
of a life insurance policy on their parent. As soon as the trust received
spray trusts for the
the proceeds, it was to put them into separate
4 5
benefit of the settlors and their descendants.
The settlors (the insured parents), the trustees, and the living
beneficiaries sought modification because the trust instrument permitted
distribution only upon the last of the settlors' parents to die, and that
event had not yet occurred. The guardian ad litem, appointed to
represent the interests of any unborn beneficiaries, consented to the
modification. An estate and tax planning attorney testified that if the
trust was unable to distribute the proceeds to the spray trusts until the
death of the settlors' mother, who was still alive, the trust would suffer
serious tax consequences that could not logically have been anticipated
by the settlors.146 47The supreme court affirmed the trial court's refusal
of a modification.1
While evidence of adverse tax consequences is a relevant considerThe
ation, it was not alone sufficient to justify a modification."
supreme court also pointed to other possible reasons why the evidence

140. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-176 (1997).
141. See Bedgood v. Thomas, 220 Ga. 262, 138 S.E.2d 313 (1964), in which the court,
by dictum, recognized the inherent power but still found that the facts did not justify its
exercise.
142. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-153 (1997).
143. Id.
144. 268 Ga. 721, 492 S.E.2d 885 (1997).
145. Id. at 721, 492 S.E.2d at 886.
146. Id. at 721-22, 492 S.E.2d at 885-86.
147. Id. at 721, 492 S.E.2d at 885.
148. Id. at 723, 492 S.E.2d at 886-87.
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failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in this case.149
The opinion specifically addressed the fact that the guardian ad litem
was a tax lawyer who consented to the modification, but gave his
reasons "in the briefest form." 5 ° Instead, the court said, such a
guardian should have fully considered the matter and then should have
given articulate reasons for his decisions.' 5'
Here there was no
evidence that the modification would not
adversely
affect the interests
152
beneficiaries.
contingent
unborn
the
of
III.
A.

LEGISLATION

Revised Probate Code

The now officially designated "Revised Probate Code of 1998" became
effective on January 1, 1998, along with numerous corrective and
refining amendments added by the 1998 session of the General
Assembly.'
A debt of gratitude is owed to the Probate Code Revision
Committee of the Fiduciary Law Section of the State Bar and to all who
contributed to the success of this project.
B.

Wrongful Death Act

Georgia's wrongful death statute was amended to increase the amount
that a surviving spouse is entitled to in a wrongful54 death recovery from
one-fourth to one-third of the amount recovered.

149. Id., 492 S.E.2d at 887.
150. Id.
151. Id.

152. Id.
153. See 1998 Ga. Laws 1586, 1591 (approving Ga. H.R. Bill 1226 Reg. Sess. (1998)).
See also O.C.G.A. § 53-1-1(a) (Supp. 1998).

154. O.C.G.A. § 51-4-2(d)(2) (Supp. 1998).

